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Abstract
This study presents an investor/entrepreneur model in which the en-
trepreneur has opportunities to manipulate the workings of the project via
hidden arrangements. We provide the optimal contracts in the presence and
absence of such hidden arrangements. The contracts specify the sharehold-
ing arrangement between investor and entrepreneur. Moreover, we render an
exact condition necessary for the credit market to form.
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O¨zet
Bu c¸alıs¸ma bir yatırımcı/giris¸imci modeli kuruyor. Modelde giris¸imcinin
projenin c¸alıs¸masını gizli anlas¸malar yoluyla degˇis¸tirme olanagˇı var. Bu
tu¨rden gizli anlas¸maların varlıgˇında ve yoklugˇunda ortaya c¸ıkacak en iyi
kontratları belirledik. Bu kontratlar yatırımcı ve giris¸imci arasındaki or-
taklık yapısını belirliyor. Ayrıca, kredi piyasasının olus¸ması ic¸in gereken
kesin kos¸ulları verdik.
Anahtar So¨zcu¨kler: Ortaklık Yapısı, Asil–Vekil I˙lis¸kisi.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Analysis of investor–entrepreneur relations with the theory of contracts has
provided important insight in recent years. In such models whenever it can
be assumed that the entrepreneur has more control over the implementation
of the project than the investor does, the following observation can be jus-
tified: when agency problems increase, entrepreneurs have more options to
manipulate the operation of the project to their advantage.
This study presents an investor–entrepreneur model with collusion be-
tween the entrepreneur and the agent operating the project. The entrepreneur
has the ability to influence the workings of the project via hidden arrange-
ments.
Our model builds upon a two principal, one agent version of the one in
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). The first and wealth-constrained principal,
the entrepreneur, is risk-neutral and possesses an asset/project, but lacks the
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required startup capital and needs to employ a risk-averse agent (manager)
to operate it. The critical feature of our model is that the project renders two
dimensional verifiable and non-divertable returns, which can be interpreted
respectively as money and power. Naturally, the technology is such that
money and power are substitutes.
The entrepreneur can obtain the startup capital from an investor (the sec-
ond, risk-neutral and non-wealth-constrained principal), who must be paid off
from the returns of the project. In order to do that, the entrepreneur makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the investor, and this offer consists of a con-
tract, a feasible monetary compensation scheme and shares of the project.1
If possible an easy method of compensating the investor is to pay back the
startup capital (possibly with interest) from the monetary returns of the
project. However, when the monetary returns do not suffice, then the en-
trepreneur also has to give some portion of the project to the investor.2 This
arrangement, then, gives birth to non-trivial strategic interactions between
the investor and the entrepreneur.
1Our model contains only one investor. Yet, due to the entrepreneur making a take-it-
or-leave-it offer, our model can be interpreted as one in which there are many competing
investors. This is because, in both of these formulations the results will not change due
to the investor(s) not obtaining any additional surplus.
2The act of giving some portion of the project to the investor in exchange for the
startup capital can be seen as the entrepreneur selling some of his shares. The price at
which this transaction occurs can be derived from our results characterizing the optimal
contracts between the entrepreneur and the investor, namely Propositions 1 and 3.
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Indeed, we assume that the entrepreneur and the investor do not view
the two dimensional returns the same, that is, their priorities over money
and power differ. The fact that investors and entrepreneurs might have
different objectives is a well known phenomenon and needs mentioning at
this point. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) discusses “some major
conglomerates, whose founders built vast empires without returning much to
investors”.
In our model, the monetary returns are transferable, but the second re-
turn (power) is not. The only way for the entrepreneur to transfer some of
the second return is by giving the investor some shares of the project. More-
over, we assume that the entrepreneur assigns a higher value to the second
return than the investor does. In particular, both of the principals’ payoff
functions aggregate the expected returns in a linear fashion, where the dif-
ference between the two is due to entrepreneur’s coefficient for power being
strictly higher than that of the investor.
There are two technical assumptions for the derivation of our results. As-
sumption 1 ensures that it is strictly beneficial for the investor to own the
whole project while the entrepreneur cannot manipulate the agent. It should
be pointed out that under this assumption the set of feasible contracts (be-
tween the entrepreneur and the investor) which makes both principals willing
to participate is non-empty. Assumption 2 guarantees that the participation
constraint of the second player is nonempty. When this assumption does not
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hold, then the participation constraint of the second principal cannot hold
for any shareholding arrangement. It should be pointed out that Assumption
1 fails to guarantee this constraint. Thus, even though Assumption 1 holds,
if Assumption 2 does not hold the market collapses, i.e. the project cannot
be financed by the investor.
As mentioned above, when the monetary returns from the project do not
suffice to pay back the startup capital, the investor must be given some shares
of the project. Consequently, he has a say in the arrangement/allocation of
the resources on the two dimensional returns for this project. The process
of deciding which arrangement to choose is modeled with a utilitarian bar-
gaining problem between investor and entrepreneur, where their bargaining
weights are given by the fraction of the project they own.3
Therefore, when the entrepreneur can commit to honor the outcome of
the bargaining process between him and the investor,4 the entrepreneur of-
fers the optimal (incentive compatible and individually rational) contract
to the agent that ensures the implementation of the allocation determined
by the bargaining process. However, when such a commitment is impossible,
the entrepreneur has an opportunity to have the agent implement another ar-
rangement via a secret side contract between the agent and the entrepreneur.
That is, in the no-commitment case the entrepreneur and the agent may col-
3We refer the reader to Thomson (1981) for more on utilitarian bargaining problems.
4Alternatively, the investor perfectly observes all interaction between entrepreneur and
agent.
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lude, and this leads to an agency problem which is in the same spirit as those
in the renegotiation proofness of Maskin and Moore (1999), and the collusion
proofness of Laffont and Martimort (2000).
We show that the optimal contract between the investor and the en-
trepreneur is not immune to collusion. Furthermore, characterizations of
the optimal contracts in both commitment and no-commitment cases are
provided. Based on those characterizations, we investigate the effect of col-
lusion on investor’s share of the project. We show the existence of cases where
this share increase and decrease. Moreover, in both commitment and collu-
sion the associated optimal contracts make the entrepreneur obtain strictly
positive payoffs, while the investor is not given any additional surplus.
When the entrepreneur may collude with the agent, he has the opportu-
nity to offer a hidden side contract to the agent. Hence, it must be that the
investor is not paying any of the resulting additional costs, because other-
wise he would become aware of this arrangement. Thus, the entrepreneur’s
benefit of collusion with the agent consists of the collection of additional re-
turns from determining the allocation of resources on his own. Meanwhile,
the entrepreneur’s cost of collusion is due to him being restricted to pay all
the additional costs on his own. Then, we prove that in the no-commitment
case the investor (considering the entrepreneur’s offer) knows the following:
the entrepreneur will make sure that the project will be implemented with a
weight (on market share) strictly lower than the one obtained from the bar-
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gaining between the two. That is, with collusion the entrepreneur is able to
divert the payments that were supposed to be made to the agent, by making
him work at an arrangement different than the one agreed by the investor.
Zingales (1994) and Barca (1995) provide some partial empirical support
for our conclusions. Indeed they conclude that managers in Italy (whom are
to be interpreted as the entrepreneurs in our setting) have significant oppor-
tunities to divert profits to themselves and not share them with shareholders
uninvolved in the companies’ operations.
Our model can be applied to shareholding by commercial banks, a topic
of recent interest. In our model, the investor can be interpreted as a bank,
providing funds, and it is not difficult to imagine that the bank/investor has
little expertise on the particular field of the project. It should be noted that
while in some countries, such as the USA, shareholding is prohibited, while in
others such as Japan, Norway, and Canada banks are allowed to own equities
of firms up to a certain legal limit. Santos (1999) reports that
This limit is 50 percent in Norway; 25 percent in Portugal; 10
percent in Canada and Finland; 5 percent in Belgium, Japan,
the Netherlands, and Sweden; and zero percent in the United
States, because U.S. commercial banks are not allowed to invest
in equity. Germany and Switzerland are examples of countries
where banks’ investments in equity are not limited by that form
of regulation.
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Moreover, Flath (1993) examines the situation in Japan reports that “largest
debtholders ...[among Japanese banks] hold more stock if the firms ... [are
more] prone to the agency problems of debt ...”. James (1995) specifies
conditions where banks are willing to own equity. It should be mentioned
that Santos (1999) argues that ”equity regulation is never Pareto-improving
and does not increase the bank’s stability”.
We specify a condition, Assumption 2, which must be satisfied in order
that the credit market form. In cases where this specification is not fulfilled,
the investor does not have any incentives to provide the necessary funding
regardless of the amount of shares offered to him. Hence, we provide a
necessary condition for the participation constraint of the investor.
For the rest of the section, we wish to discuss some aspects of our model in
more detail. First of all, it is imperative to stress that in our model collusion
occurs between the entrepreneur and the agent. Hence, unlike the situation
in Itoh (1991), Laffont and Martimort (2000), Laffont and Martimort (1997)
and Barlo (2006), in this study collusion is not an ingredient of the strategic
interaction among agents. Rather, it shares the same spirit as the renego-
tiation proofness of Maskin and Moore (1999), because the entrepreneur is
restricted to offer contracts which are immune to his intervention in the later
stages of the game.
The second point we wish to emphasize is about the structure of our
model. We borrow the basic model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) in
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which attention is restricted to CARA utilities (for the agent), normally
distributed returns and linear contracts. 5 Our modifications consist of using
two principals (instead of only one), and solving the interaction between
the two principals with utilitarian bargaining in the commitment case, and
incorporating collusion between one of the principals and the agent into this
setting. Moreover, we need to mention that dispensing with the agent in
this model is a possibility, yet, we believe keeping the agent as a part of the
analysis is more appealing in terms of applications.
The third and final aspect that we wish to discuss concerns principal’s
benefit functions. As mentioned above, we assume that both principals’ re-
turns are not transferable. On the other hand, the monetary returns from the
project can be transferred without any frictions, yet, the only way to trans-
fer utility using the second return involves transfer of shares. Moreover, we
assume that each principals aggregate the expected two dimensional returns
linearly, and the only difference between the two arises due to the multiplier
of power. We argue that this form essentially captures the inherent distinc-
tion between an entrepreneur and an investor, and also allows us to come up
5The reader may need to be reminded that the pioneering model in this field is given in
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). This research was followed by Schattler and Sung (1993)
and Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) who provided important extensions. Those studies feature
repeated agency settings in which the lack of income effects (due to exponential utility
functions) are employed to show the optimality of linear contracts. Lafontaine (1992) and
Slade (1996), on the other hand, provide empirical evidence for the use of linear contracts.
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with a clear presentation. Therefore, using these observations an alternative
interpretation for the two types of returns in our model can be given as fol-
lows: let the first return be the immediate monetary ones, and the second
be the “market share” of the project. Assuming that the level of personal
authority that the entrepreneur derives from the project is not transferable
and increases with market share, suffices for our purposes. It should be
pointed out that this last assumption is consistent with our interpretation
of the identities of the principals. Indeed, we think of the entrepreneur to
be someone who is associated in the area of the project and has an “idea”
but not the cash, and the investor to be a financial intermediary whose first
priority is monetary, which is potentially followed by his investments’ market
shares.
Chapter 2 develops the model with commitment: Proposition 1 charac-
terizes its solution. In chapter 3 we extend the model to capture collusion
between the entrepreneur and the agent, and in Proposition 2 we show that
the commitment contract (between the entrepreneur and the investor) is not
immune to collusion. Moreover, Proposition 3 characterizes the solution in
the no-commitment case. Chapter 4 concludes.
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Chapter 2
The Model With Commitment
We will consider a linear, two–principal, single–agent, and two–task hidden–
action model with state–contingent, observable and verifiable two–dimensional
returns. Indeed it builds upon a two principal version of the one presented
in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), and we will keep their notation.
Principal 1, the entrepreneur, owns an asset which requires a capital
fixed cost of K > 0, and an agent. If operated, this asset delivers two–
dimensional, state–contingent, observable and verifiable returns drawn from a
normal distribution whose covariance matrix is assumed to be fixed. Through
out this study, it is useful to assume that the first dimension of the returns is
monetary, and the second related to individual power. Principal 1 does not
possess the required capital investment of K, but has the option of obtaining
it from principal 2, the investor; by paying him a fixed compensation R,
and possibly making principal 2 be a partner with a share (1 − ρ), where
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ρ ∈ [0, 1] be the share of principal 1. Both of the principals are risk-neutral,
and evaluate the two dimensional returns as follows: Given an expected
monetary and power return b = (b1, b2), the gross benefits (not including the
costs of operating the project) to principal i is given by ρi(b1 + λib2), where
ρ1 = ρ, ρ2 = (1 − ρ), and λi > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume
that λ1 > λ2. Moreover, given (ρ,R), the two principals will be involved in
a utilitarian bargaining where each of them has a bargaining power given by
the share of the project they possess.
After determining the nature of the point that they want to implement,
they will seek to employ an agent, who has CARA utilities. Furthermore,
the mean of the two–dimensional returns is determined by the employee’s
effort choice, which none of the principals can observe or verify. Hence, any
contract to be offered cannot depend on agent’s effort choice.
In summary, the timing of the game is as follows:
t = 1 : Principal 1 offers (ρ,R) to principal 2 for him to supplyK, and principal
2 accepts or rejects. If principal 2 rejects the offer, the game ends and
both principals get a payoff of 0; otherwise, it continues.
t = 2 : With bargaining weights given by their share of the project, the prin-
cipals bargain over the feasible allocation of resources for the project.
This determines a level of λ¯ ∈ [λ2, λ1] that the principals have agreed
upon.
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t = 3 : Given λ¯, the principals determine the optimal contract, and the en-
trepreneur offers it to the agent;
t = 4 : The agent chooses whether or not he should accept the offer, and exert
the effort level the principals would like him to. Then, the observable
and verifiable (by all) state is realized.
t = 5 : The entrepreneur makes the payments to the agent, and all of them
are both observable and verifiable by the investor.
2.1 Agent’s Problem
The agent determines a vector of efforts t ∈ <2+. The monetary and private
cost of effort is given by C : <2+ → <+. We assume that C(t1, t2) = k1t
2
1
2
+
k2t22
2
,
where k1, k2 are both strictly positive real numbers. We should note that
C as defined above is a continuous and strictly convex function. Once t
is determined, the returns are distributed with a two–dimensional normal
distribution with mean
µ(t) =
 µ1(t1)
µ2(t2)
 =
 γ1t1
γ2t2
 . (2.1)
It should be noticed that µ : <2+ → <2 is a continuous and concave function of
t. The agent’s effort choice creates a two–dimensional signal of information,
x ∈ <2, observable and verifiable by the two principals. x is given by x =
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µ(t)+², where ² is normally distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix
Σ =
 σ21 0
0 σ22
 .
The agent has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions,
with a given CARA coefficient of r ∈ <++. That is for w ∈ <, u(w) = −e−rw.
Under a compensation scheme w : <2 → <, where w(x) is often to be referred
to as the wage at information signal x, the agent’s expected utility is given by
u(CE) =
∫ +∞
−∞ − exp{−r(w(x)− C(t))}dx, where CE denotes the certainty
equivalent money payoff of the agent under the compensation scheme w.
Moreover, the reserve certainty equivalent figure of the agent is normalized
to 0.
We restrict attention to linear compensation rules of the form w(x) =
αTx + β, where α ∈ <2+, and β ∈ <. Making use of the CARA utilities and
the normal distribution, it is easy to show that under our formulation the
certainty equivalent of such a compensation scheme is
CE = (α1γ1t1 + α2γ2t2)−
(
k1t
2
1
2
+
k2t
2
2
2
)
− 1
2
r
(
α21σ
2
1 + α
2
2σ
2
2
)
+ β.
Consequently, by considering the first order conditions it is straightforward
to see that given a linear compensation scheme, agent’s optimal choice of
effort is
t∗` =
γ`α`
k`
, (2.2)
` = 1, 2.
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2.2 Optimal Offer To The Agent
The expected gross benefits from the project of principal i, i = 1, 2; is given
by Bi(t). As we mentioned above, we let Bi(t) = µ1(t1) + λi µ2(t2), where
λi > 0 for i = 1, 2.
At this stage it is useful to come back to the initial phase of the game.
As mentioned above, first the principals will bargain to determine the weight
λ¯ ∈ [λ2, λ1] (recall that we have assumed without loss of generality that
λ1 > λ2) to be used when the optimal contact is to be formulated. After
agreeing on λ¯, principal i’s problem is
max
α,β
ρi
(
µ1(t1) + λ¯µ2(t2)− C(t)− 1
2
r
(
α21σ
2
1 + α
2
2σ
2
2
))
(2.3)
subject to (2.2), because while collecting ρi portion of the returns, principal
i has to pay also ρi portion of the costs as well. Therefore, after agreeing on
λ¯, the incentives of the two principals are perfectly aligned; or formally, the
solution to (2.3), is the same as the solution to the following (aggregated)
maximization problem
max
α,β
(
µ1(t1) + λ¯µ2(t2)− C(t)− 1
2
r
(
α21σ
2
1 + α
2
2σ
2
2
))
(2.4)
By Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) we know that the optimal contract
would not render any excess surplus to the agent. Thus, the optimal constant
intercept, β∗, (which does not affect incentives due to lack of income effects
thanks to CARA utility function) must be such that, at the optimal contract
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CE = 0. (Recall that the reserve certainty equivalent figure of the agent is
normalized to 0.)
Working with first order conditions to solve the principals’ problem, one
can show that α∗1 and α
∗
2 are given as follows
α∗1 =
γ21
k1
γ21
k1
+ rσ21
, (2.5)
and
α∗2 =
γ22
k2
γ22
k2
+ rσ22
λ¯ . (2.6)
Now, substituting equations 2.5 and 2.6, into equation 2.2, and using 2.1, it
can be obtained that when the principals agree on λ¯, the project will deliver
the following net benefit to principal i when λ¯ ∈ [λ2, λ1] is implemented:
Πi(λ¯) =
1
2
Φ1 + λ¯
(
λi − 1
2
λ¯
)
Φ2, (2.7)
where
Φ` =
(
γ2`
k`
)2
γ2`
k`
+ rσ2`
, (2.8)
` = 1, 2.
Lemma 1 The following hold for Πi : [λ2, λ1]→ <, i = 1, 2:
1. For all λ¯ ∈ [λ2, λ1], Π1(λ¯)− Π2(λ¯) = λ¯(λ1−λ2)Φ2 > 0;
2. Πi is strictly increasing for λˆ < λi, and strictly decreasing for λˆ > λi;
and,
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3. Πi is strictly concave on (0, 1), and ∂Πi(λ¯)/∂ λ¯ evaluated at λ¯ = λi
equals 0.
Proof. While the first conclusion follows from employing equation (2.7),
the others are due to the derivative of Πi(λ¯) being given by
∂Πi
∂ λ¯
= Φ2 (λi − λ) . (2.9)
Thus, in order to guarantee the non-emptiness of the participation con-
straint of principal 1, the following technical assumption is needed:
Assumption 1 The following holds:
1
2
(λ2)
2Φ2 > K − 1
2
Φ1. (2.10)
What Assumption 1 says is that in the case when principal 2 is the sole
owner, it should be worthwhile to undertake this project. Notice that when
this condition holds, then for any ρ ∈ [0, 1], and for any λ ∈ [λ2, λ1], the
participation constraint of principal 1 will be non-empty. This is because
ρΠ1(λ) + (1− ρ)Π2(λ)−K = λ
(
(ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2)− 1
2
λ
)
Φ2 −K + 1
2
Φ1
≥ 1
2
(λ2)
2Φ2 −K + 1
2
Φ1 > 0.
The inequality preceding the last is due to λ ∈ [λ2, λ1]. It should be pointed
out that the participation constraint of the second principal is ensured by
this very same condition. Because that it will be dealt later in greater detail,
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it suffices for now to mention that the participation constraint of principal 1
already takes care of that of the second principal due to the following: When
player 1 has opportunities to make strictly positive profits, then he would
make sure that principal 2 gets at least a payoff of K, ensuring his individual
rationality.
2.3 Bargaining Over Implementable Contracts
Having determined the outcome and associated net returns, we may restrict
attention to the bargaining between the two principals in the first phase of
the game.
The two principals will bargain over the choice of λ¯, and the set of ad-
missible values must be in [λ2, λ1]. If the principals cannot agree in that
bargaining, the project cannot go ahead, and thus, we assume each gets a
return equal to their reserve value which is normalized to 0. Hence, the
bargaining set is
S = {(pi1, pi2) : pii ∈ [0,Πi(λ)], for some λ ∈ [λ2, λ1]}. (2.11)
The Pareto optimal1 frontier of S denoted by ∂S then is
∂S = {(pi1, pi2) : pii = Πi(λ), for some λ ∈ [λ2, λ1]} .
The following lemma establishes that (S,0) is a well defined and “nice”
1By Pareto optimality we mean the regular, non–strict, one.
17
bargaining problem. Moreover, such a bargaining set is given in figure 2.1
for the case when λ1 = 3/4, λ2 = 1/4, Φ1 = 1, and Φ2 = 2.
Lemma 2 S is non–empty, compact and convex. Moreover, ∂S is strictly
concave.
Proof. Non–emptiness is trivial, because pi = (Π1(λ2),Π2(λ2)) is both in
S. Moreover, since all the variables are continuous, and [λ2, λ1] is compact,
compactness of S follows.
Since showing convexity of S is a standard exercise, it suffices to prove
that ∂S is strictly concave. To that regard, let α ∈ (0, 1) and pi, pi′ ∈ ∂S with
λ and λ′ such that pii = Πi(λ) and pi′i = Πi(λ
′), for all i. For a contradiction
suppose that p˜i = αpi + (1 − α)pi′ is in ∂S. Thus, there exists λ˜ such that
p˜ii = Πi(λ˜). Hence, due to the strict concavity of Πi, i = 1, 2, established in
Lemma 1, we have
Πi(λ˜) = αΠi(λ) + (1− α)Πi(λ′) < Πi(αλ+(1− α)λ′), (2.12)
i = 1, 2. Finally, due to the same Lemma, we know that Π1 is strictly
increasing, therefore, inequality 2.12 implies λ˜ < α λ+(1− α)λ′. The proof
finishes, because the same inequality and Π2 being strictly decreasing implies
λ˜ > α λ+(1− α)λ′, delivering the necessary contradiction.
These bargaining problems will be solved by the utilitarian solution con-
cept. Please refer to Thomson (1981) for a detailed analysis of this bargain-
ing solution. That is, for (S,0), and for any given weights θ, (1− θ) ∈ [0, 1],
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piθ ∈ S˜ is the θ–utilitarian bargaining solution of (S,0) if and only if
(piθ1, pi
θ
2) = N (S,0; θ) ≡ argmax(pi1,pi2)∈S θpi1 + (1− θ)pi2. (2.13)
Note that by Lemma 2, there exists a unique solution to (S,0) for all θ ∈
[0, 1], thus N (S,0; θ) is a function. Moreover, it should be pointed out that
we treat θ ∈ [0, 1] as exogenously given. For notational purposes, we let λθ
be defined by Πi(λ
θ) = piθi , for i = 1, 2.
Lemma 3 For every θ ∈ [0, 1], N (S,0; θ) is a function, and λθ ∈ [λ2, λ1] is
strictly increasing in θ and is uniquely determined as follows:
λθ = θ λ1+(1− θ)λ2 . (2.14)
Proof. The required conditions for the existence of the utilitarian bar-
gaining solution fθ have been shown to be satisfied. Namely, S is compact
and convex, 0 ∈ S, and by Assumption 1, there exists some s ∈ S with
sj > 0, for j = 1, 2. Therefore, for any θ ∈ [0, 1] we have N (S,0; θ) 6= ∅.
Moreover, since ∂S is strictly concave, N (S,0; θ) is a function. By the Pareto
efficiency axiom for the utilitarian bargaining solutions, N (S,0; θ) ∈ ∂S, for
all θ ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that the definition of ∂S implies that there is some
λθ ∈ [λ2, λ1] such that N (S,0; θ) = (piθ1, piθ2) = (Π1(λθ),Π2(λθ)). This λθ
is unique because Πi are one-to-one (strictly monotone) functions of λ on
[λ2, λ1] by Lemma 1. Moreover, solving the following maximization problem
with first order conditions
max
λ∈[λ2,λ1]
θ
(
1
2
Φ1 + λ
(
λ1−1
2
λ
)
Φ2
)
+ (1− θ)
(
1
2
Φ1 + λ
(
λ2−1
2
λ
)
Φ2
)
.
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and noticing that the objective function is linear, and by Lemma 2 the
boundary of the constraint set is strictly concave; and further noting that
λ1−λ2 > 0, delivers the conclusion.
Thus, given (ρ,R), that the principal 1 offered to principal 2 who accepted
and supplied the capital investment of K, the net returns to principals are
Π1(ρ,R) ≡ ρΠ1(λρ) − R, and Π2(ρ,R) ≡ (1 − ρ)Π2(λρ) + R. It should
be pointed out that by Lemma 1, Π1(ρ,R) is strictly increasing in ρ, and
Π2(ρ,R) strictly decreasing.
2.4 Entrepreneur’s Optimal Offer To the In-
vestor
For (ρ,R) to be participatory for principal 2, who supplies the capital invest-
ment needed for the project, we need to have Π2(ρ,R) ≥ K. Thus, the pro-
gram that the investor, principal 1, has to solve is max(ρ,R)Π1(ρ,R) subject to
the participation constraints of the two principals, i.e. (1) Π1(ρ,R) ≥ 0, and
(2) Π2(ρ,R) ≥ K. That is, the entrepreneur solves the following problem:
max
(ρ,R)
ρΠ1(λ
ρ)−R (2.15)
subject to
ρΠ1(λ
ρ)−R ≥ 0
(1− ρ)Π2(λρ) +R ≥ K.
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Let (ρ?, R?) solve this problem. Noticing that Π1(ρ,R) is strictly increas-
ing in ρ, implies that the participation constraint of principal 2 will hold with
equality at the solution (ρ?, R?). Thus, ignoring the participation constraint
of principal 1 for now, (2.15) is reduced to
max
(ρ,R)
ρΠ1 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2) + (1− ρ)Π2 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2)−K. (2.16)
First notice that due to Lemma 1, the objective of this maximization is con-
tinuous in ρ. Moreover, principal 1 is solving a non-trivial utilitarian plan-
ner’s problem where the weights assigned to the agents must be interpreted
as their share of the project.
The following Proposition characterizes the solutions to (2.15):
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists a unique
(ρ?, R?) solving (2.15). Moreover, they are characterized as follows:
1. If 1
2
Φ1 ≥ K, then ρ? = 1, and R? = K.
2. If 1
2
Φ1 < K, then ρ
? is the maximum real number in [0, 1] solving
K − 1
2
Φ1 = (1− ρ?) (ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2) (2.17)
×
(
λ2−1
2
(ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2)
)
Φ2,
and R? = ρ?
(
1
2
Φ1
)
.
Proof. When Assumption 1 holds constraint set is non-empty and com-
pact, thus, due to the continuity of the objective function of 2.16 there exists
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a solution.2
When 1
2
Φ1 ≥ K Because that Π1(λ1) − Π2(λ2) = (1/2)Φ2(λ21−λ22) > 0
since λ1 > λ2, the optimal solution would be so that principal 1 would
be the sole owner of the project, and on expected terms would pay off the
capital investment borrowed from the second principal in full using only the
monetary returns from the project. Notice that the solution in this case is
unique.
Suppose 1
2
Φ1 < K. Let B(ρ) be defined by
B(ρ) = (1− ρ?) (ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2)
×
(
λ2−1
2
(ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2)
)
Φ2 −K + 1
2
Φ1.
It should be noticed that for any ρ ∈ [0, 1], the participation constraint of the
second principal holds whenever B(ρ) ≥ 0. Note that B(1) = 1
2
Φ1 −K < 0.
Moreover, B(0) = 1
2
λ22Φ2−K+ 12Φ1 > 0 due to Assumption 1. Consequently,
by the mean value theorem, there exists ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that B(ρ) = 0. But
the key observation needed is that
Π1 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2)− Π2 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2) = (ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2)
×(λ1−λ2)Φ2 > 0.
Thus, in the optimal solution principal 2 should get as low as possible shares
of the project, therefore, in the optimal contract he collects all the monetary
returns from the project. Moreover, the remaining utility needed from the
2Notice that Assumption 1 holds trivially when 12Φ1 ≥ K.
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individual rationality constraint of principal 2 to be satisfied, is supplied
to him by allocating as low as possible shares to him. 3 Note that this
arrangement is unique.
In figure 2.2 the graph of B(ρ) for given ρ is displayed for the following
situations: λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30. The lowest curve happens when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
=
0.045 = 1
2
λ22, i.e. when Assumption 1 holds with equality. The second lowest
curve occurs for
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.03, and finally the highest for
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01.
In order to display more details about the solution in the commitment
case, consider the following example. Let λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30, and for the
value of
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
we consider two levels 0.03 and 0.01. In figure 2.3 H(ρ)
(the definition is in footnote 3) and B(ρ) are given. Recall that principal
1 is maximizing H(ρ) subject to B(ρ) ≥ 0, and H(0) = B(0). Thus, the
solutions when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
equals 0.03 and 0.01 are given in that figure and are
labeled as ρ(1) and ρ(2), respectively.
3Alternatively, one can consider the objective function that Principal 1 paces:
H(ρ) =
[
(ρ λ1+(1− ρ)λ2)
(
ρ
(
λ1−12 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ))
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
λ2−12 (ρ λ1+(1− ρ))
))]
×Φ2 −K + 12Φ1,
subject to B(ρ) ≥ 0. Because that ∂H∂ρ = ρ (λ1−λ2)2 + λ2 (λ1−λ2) > 0, we must choose
the highest real number in [0,1], such that B(ρ) = 0.
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Figure 2.1: Bargaining set S, for λ1 = 3/4, λ2 = 1/4, Φ1 = 1, and Φ2 = 2
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Figure 2.2: The graph of B(ρ) for ρ ∈ [0, 1] and λ1 = 0.75, λ2 =
0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01 < 0.045 = 1
2
λ22 is given in the solid (the highest) curve.
The second highest one occurs when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.03. Finally, the lowest one
of them happens when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.045 = 1
2
λ22, i.e. when Assumption 1 holds
with equality.
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Figure 2.3: The graphs of H(ρ) and B(ρ) for ρ ∈ [0, 1] and λ1 = 0.75, λ2 =
0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01 (the solid curve) and λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.03
(the curve with the dots). The solutions when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
equals 0.03 and 0.01
are given in that figure and are labeled as ρ(1) and ρ(2), respectively.
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Chapter 3
Collusion Between The
Entrepreneur And The Agent
Suppose that the entrepreneur has the opportunity to collude with the agent
operating the project. Indeed, for simplicity we will assume that principal
1 has the option to convince an agent by using a hidden side contract to
implement λ 6= λρ? even if he were not to own the whole project. This can
be motivated as follows. After all, the entrepreneur is the party who came
up with this project. Therefore it is conceivable that he has more access
than principal 2 to the project, who we assumed is a financial investor not
necessarily capable of understanding the nature of the project.
The timing of the game essentially is the same, with a difference happen-
ing towards the very end of the game:
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t = 1 : Principal 1 offers (ρ,R) to principal 2 for him to supplyK, and principal
2 accepts or rejects. If principal 2 rejects the offer, the game ends,
otherwise, it continues.
t = 2 : With bargaining weights given by their share of the project, the prin-
cipals bargain over the feasible allocation of resources for the project.
This determines a level of λ¯ ∈ [λ2, λ1] that the principals have agreed
upon.
t = 3 : Given λ¯, the principals determine the optimal contract, and the en-
trepreneur offers it to the agent;
t = 4 : Principal 1 can offer a hidden side contract to the agent, in which all
resulting additional costs have to be covered by Principal 1.
t = 5 : The agent chooses whether or not he should accept one of these two
offers, and exert the effort level desired. And, the observable and veri-
fiable state is realized.
t = 6 : Finally, the entrepreneur makes the payments to the agent, and has the
option of doing so in a way that the investor cannot observe or verify.
It should be pointed out that because the side contract needs to remain
hidden, extra payments to the agent cannot be reflected to the investor. In
order for the investor not to infer the true allocation of resources for the
project, the entrepreneur needs to possess the ability of compensating the
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agent secretly. Thus, some payments to the agent (made by the entrepreneur)
cannot be observable and/or verifiable by the investor.1 Thus, having agreed
on an allocation described by λ¯ and on the fraction of shares given by ρ, the
investor observes (and can verify) the state and pays only (1−ρ) of the costs
resulting at λ¯. Otherwise, he would easily infer that the allocation is not
given by λ¯.
Consequently, the net payoff to the entrepreneur when he deviates to λ
is his gross benefit from implementing the project at λ, minus all the cost of
implementing the project at λ, plus the (1− ρ) portion of the costs resulting
from λ¯. Thus, the investor continues to pay his share of the costs as if the
project is being implemented at λ¯, and additional costs are covered by the
entrepreneur.
It needs to be emphasized that investor’s ability of observing (and veri-
fying) the state is not sufficient to infer that the entrepreneur has deviated
to some other allocation. This is because, the investor does not observe the
real mean, but rather stochastic outcomes of the project. That is, when the
entrepreneur deviates to an allocation λ not equal to λ¯ (the level that they
have agreed upon), the investor still thinks that his average return is given
by λ¯, and not by λ.
Recall that the gross benefit of the entrepreneur is given by B1(λ) =
1On the other hand, the hidden contract between the entrepreneur and the agent is
binding because each of them can verify its ingredients.
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µ1(t1) + µ2(t2)λ1 . Using the optimal efforts given in (2.2), the optimal con-
tract parameters in (2.5), (2.6), and the definition of Φl in (2.8) we find
B1(λ) = Φ1 + Φ2 λλ1 . (3.1)
Cost incurred to principals when some λ is implemented is derived by em-
ploying the facts used in the derivation of (3.1), and the cost function present
in (2.4). It is
κ(λ) =
1
2
(Φ1 + Φ2 λ
2). (3.2)
Thus,
Π1
(
λ | ρ, λ¯) = ρB1(λ)− κ(λ) + (1− ρ)κ(λ¯).
Plugging in the definitions, and rearranging we find
Π1
(
λ | ρ, λ¯) = ρ(1
2
Φ1 + λ
(
λ1−1
2
λ
)
Φ2
)
− 1
2
(1− ρ) Φ2
(
λ2− (λ¯)2) .
(3.3)
For a given (ρ, λ¯) the partial derivative of Π1
(
λ | ρ, λ¯) with respect to λ is
given by
∂Π1
(
λ | ρ, λ¯)
∂ λ
= Φ2 (ρ λ1−λ) . (3.4)
Hence, Π1
(
λ | ρ, λ¯) is strictly concave, having a unique solution at ρ λ1.
Next we display that in the case when 1
2
Φ1 < K and Assumption 1 hold,
the deviation of the entrepreneur from λρ
?
(as described in Proposition 1)
to ρ? λ1 is strictly profitable. Notice that when
1
2
Φ1 ≥ K, ρ? = 1, thus,
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λρ
?
= λ1. Therefore, in that case there are no profitable deviations for the
entrepreneur.
Proposition 2 Suppose that 1
2
Φ1 < K and Assumption 1 holds, and let
(ρ?, R?) be as given in Proposition 1. Then, under collusion principal 1 has
a strictly profitable deviation.
Proof. The optimal deviation of principal 1 at given levels of ρ? and
λρ
?
would be one that maximizes (3.3) subject to λ > 0. But we know
that (3.4) implies ρ? λ1 maximizes his objective. Further, due to
1
2
Φ1 <
K and Assumption 1, we know that ρ? < 1. Thus, ρ? λ1 < ρ
? λ1+(1 −
ρ?)λ2 = λ
ρ? . Let the payoffs from any deviation λ ∈ [ρ? λ1, ρ? λ1+(1 −
ρ?)λ2] be given by D(λ) ≡ Π1
(
λ | ρ?, λρ?)−Π1 (λρ? | ρ?, λρ?). Because that
Π1
(
λ | ρ?, λρ?) is strictly decreasing for all λ ∈ (ρ? λ1, λρ? ], and D(λρ?) = 0,
and Π1
(
λρ
? | ρ?, λρ?) is constant in λ, we conclude that for all λ ∈ [ρ? λ1, λρ?),
D(λ) > 0.
3.1 Optimal Arrangement With Collusion
In this section the important feature is that principal 2 knows that principal 1
and the agent can collude via a hidden contract between the two. Thus, when
accepting principal 1’s offer, (ρ,R) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, K], principal 2 knows that
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the point that will be implemented, λ(ρ) must solve the following problem:
λ(ρ) ∈ argmaxλ∈[0,1]Π1 (λ | ρ, λ(ρ)) ≡ ρ
(
1
2
Φ1 + λ
(
λ1−1
2
λ
)
Φ2
)
(3.5)
−1
2
(1− ρ) Φ2
(
λ2− (λ(ρ))2) .
Because that it was already shown in the proof of Proposition 2 that Π1 (λ | ρ, λ(ρ))
is continuous and strictly concave in λ, it can easily be proven that the unique
solution to (3.5) for any given (ρ,R) is
λ(ρ) = ρ λ1 . (3.6)
Consequently, the problem that principal 1 has to solve at the beginning
of the game in order to identify the optimal offer that needs to be made to
principal 2, is:
max
(ρ,R)
ρΠ1(ρ λ1)−R, (3.7)
subject to
(1− ρ)Π2(ρ λ1) +R ≥ K,
ρΠ1(ρ λ1)−R ≥ 0.
For what follows, first we will derive a condition that will ensure that the
constraint set of this maximization problem is not empty. Let,
A(ρ) ≡ (1− ρ) (ρ λ1)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρ λ1)
)
Φ2 −K + 1
2
Φ1.
Because that principal 1 always obtains strictly higher payoffs from the
project than the principal 2, as was done in the proof of Proposition 1,
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all the monetary returns from the project, 1
2
Φ1, will be allocated to the sec-
ond principal. Thus, it can be observed that the participation constraint of
the second principal holds whenever A(ρ) ≥ 0. Therefore, the question is
whether or not there exists a ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that A(ρ) ≥ 0.
Note that A(ρ) < 0 whenever ρ < 0. Moreover, for ρ > 1 high enough
A(ρ) > 0. On the other hand, A(1) = 1
2
Φ1 − K = A(0). Thus, the local
maximum, ρ˜ must be in (0, 1). The condition we impose to guarantee that
there exists a ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that A(ρ) ≥ 0, requires A(ρ˜) ≥ 0. That is why
we consider ∂A(ρ)
∂ρ
= 0, and (as figure 3.1 displays) we have two roots, the
lower one the local maximum, and the higher one the local minimum. In
Assumption 2 we require that the local maximum providing ρ, the lower root
of ∂A(ρ)
∂ρ
= 0 (that we labeled as ρ˜) is such that A(ρ˜) ≥ 0. Because then, there
exits ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that the participation constraint of the second player is
nonempty.
Assumption 2 Let λ1, λ2, K,Φ1,Φ2 be such that A(ρ˜) ≥ 0 where
ρ˜ ≡ 1
3λ1
(
2λ2+λ1−
√(
4λ22−2λ1 λ2+λ21
)) ∈ (0, 1).
It is worthwhile to note that Assumption 1 fails to guarantee the par-
ticipation constraint of the second principal. This can be observed in figure
3.1 which displays A(ρ) < 0 for ρ ∈ [0, 1] in the case when Assumption
1 holds: λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.03 < 0.045 = 1
2
λ22. But when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01, then the same figure displays that participation constraint of
the second principal holds for some ρ.
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The importance of Assumption 2 is that when it does not hold, then the
participation constraint of the second principal cannot hold for any ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, even though Assumption 1 holds, if Assumption 2 does not hold the
market collapses, i.e. the project cannot be financed by the investor.
This situation happens for values λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.03 <
0.045 = 1
2
λ22. Note that then Assumption 1 holds, but (as figure 3.1 displays)
Assumption 2 does not. Therefore, even though the solution under the com-
mitment case is ρ(1) (as was shown in figure 2.3), the market collapses and
the project is not financed by the second principal because his participation
constraint cannot be satisfied at no ρ ∈ [0, 1].
However, when Assumption 2 holds, the solution can be found as follows.
Consider the values λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01 < 0.045 = 1
2
λ22. It
should be noticed that both Assumptions hold at these values. Now principal
1 is maximizing
G(ρ) = ρ (ρ λ1)
(
λ1−1
2
(ρ λ1)
)
+ (1− ρ) (ρ λ1)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρ λ1)
)
− K −
1
2
Φ1
Φ2
,
subject to A(ρ) ≥ 0. Both G and A are depicted in figure 3.2. Note that A
is equal to 0 in two spots. But because that
∂G
∂ρ
= ρ (λ1−λ2)2 + λ2 (λ1−ρ λ2) > 0,
the solution ρ(3) is the higher of the two roots of A(ρ) = 0.
The following Proposition will characterize the solutions to (3.7):
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then:
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1. If 1
2
Φ1 ≥ K, then the solution (ρO, RO) is given by ρO = 1, and RO = K.
2. If 1
2
Φ1 < K and Assumption 2 does not hold, then the market collapses,
and the project is not financed by the second player.
3. If 1
2
Φ1 < K and Assumption 2 holds, then the solution (ρ
O, RO) is such
that ρO is the maximum real number in [0, 1] which solves
(1− ρO) (ρO λ1)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρO λ1)
)
Φ2 = K − 1
2
Φ1, (3.8)
and RO = ρO
(
1
2
Φ1
)
.
Proof. Note that for (ρO, RO), the individual rationality constraint of
principal 1 is satisfied, because (ρO λ1)
2 (1−1/2ρO)Φ2 > 0. Moreover, due to
the rest of the proof being very similar to that of Proposition 1, it is omitted.
3.2 Collusion versus Commitment
We have some tools to visualize and compare the shareholding structure in
collusion and commitment cases. Let us consider the only non-trivial case
where 1
2
Φ1 < K, and Assumption 1, and Assumption 2 hold. Then, we have
shown that ρ? is the maximum real number in [0, 1] solving
(1− ρ?) (ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρ? λ1+(1− ρ?)λ2)
)
Φ2 = K − 1
2
Φ1,
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and that ρO is the maximum real number in [0, 1] which solves
(1− ρO) (ρO λ1)
(
λ2−1
2
(ρO λ1)
)
Φ2 = K − 1
2
Φ1.
These relationships provide the general picture of the problem at hand.
However, it fails to force an exact relation between ρO, and ρ?. That is, by
changing the specifics of the problem, we can have ρO < ρ?, and ρO > ρ?.
Now, we will consider an example. Let λ2 = 2, and λ1 = 3. Hence,
(1 − ρ∗)(ρ∗ + 2)(1 − ρ∗
2
) =
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
, and (1 − ρO)(3ρO)(2 − 3
2
ρO) =
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
.
This alignment allows, with different values of
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
, different orderings
for ρO, and ρ?. For C = 0.25, 0.848 = ρ? < ρO = 0.863; whereas for C =
0.95, 0.494 = ρ? > ρO = 0.488. Hence it is not possible to obtain a general
relationship between ρ?, and ρO.
36
Figure 3.1: The graph ofA(ρ) for ρ ∈ [0, 1] and λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 0.30, K−
1
2
Φ1
Φ2
=
0.03 < 0.045 = 1
2
λ22 is given in the solid curve. Whereas, the same situation
when
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01 is depicted in the curve with the dots.
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Figure 3.2: The solution for the no-commitment case for values λ1 =
0.75, λ2 = 0.30,
K− 1
2
Φ1
Φ2
= 0.01 < 0.045 = 1
2
λ22. G(ρ) and A(ρ) are depicted,
and the solution is ρ(3).
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Chapter 4
Concluding Remarks
We wish to point out the fact that our research tries to explain the existing
issue of shareholding by investors and shows the consequences of the structure
of the issue. However, the fact that investors do not have effective control
rights remains a problem. Typically, investors do not possess mechanisms
to control how their funds are used. Thus, we have a mechanism design
problem. Therefore, a future avenue for research is to attempt to devise
mechanisms to force corporations pursue the rights of their investors. Once
there are such mechanisms, external funding of corporations becomes easier.
39
Bibliography
Barca, F. (1995): “On Corpotate Governance in Italy: Issues, facts, and
agency, manuscript,” Bank of Italy, Rome.
Barlo, M. (2006): “Collusion in Hidden–Action Models,” Sabancı Univer-
sity.
Flath, D. (1993): “Shareholding in the Keiretsu, Japan’s Financial
Groups,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 75, 249–257.
Hellwig, M., and K. M. Schmidt (2002): “Discrete-Time Approxima-
tions of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal
Incentive Provision,” Econometrica, 70(6), 2225–2264.
Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom (1987): “Aggregation and Linearity in
the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,” Econometrica, 55(2), 303–28.
(1991): “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts,
Asset Ownership and Job Design,” Journal of Law, Economics and Orga-
nization, 7(Special Issue), 24–52.
40
Itoh, H. (1991): “Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations,” Econo-
metrica, 59, 611–636.
James, C. (1995): “When Do Banks Take Equity in Debt Restructurings?,”
Review of Financial Studies, 8, 1209–1234.
Laffont, J.-J., and D. Martimort (1997): “Collusion under Asymmet-
ric Information,” Econometrica, 65, 875–911.
(2000): “Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation,”
Econometrica, 68, 309–342.
Lafontaine, F. (1992): “Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical
Results,” Rand Journal of Economics, 23, 263–283.
Maskin, E., and J. Moore (1999): “Implementation and Renegotiation,”
Review of Economic Studies, 66.
Santos, J. (1999): “Bank Capital and Equity Investment Regulations,”
Journal of Banking and Finance, 23, 1095–1120.
Schattler, H., and J. Sung (1993): “The Fisrt-Order Approach to
the Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem with Exponential Utility,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 61, 331–371.
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny (1997): “A Survey of Gorporate Gov-
ernance,” Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737–783.
41
Slade, M. E. (1996): “Multitask Agency Contract Choice: An Empirical
Exploration,” International Economic Review, 37(2), 465–486.
Thomson, W. (1981): “Nash Bargaining Solution and Utilitarian Choice
Rules,” Econometrica, 49(2), 535–538.
Zingales, L. (1994): “The value of the voting right: a study of the Milan
Stock Exchange experience,” Review of Financial Studies, 7(1), 125–148.
42
